The effect of precommitment and past-experience on insurance choices : an experimental study
Résumé.
Ce papier présente les résultats d'une étude expérimentale consacrée à l'analyse des comportements d'assurance face à des
risques de petites probabilités occasionnant de lourdes pertes potentielles. Cette étude révèle que les comportements
d'assurance individuels sont susceptibles de dépendre d'une part du vécu des individus face au risque, d'autre part de la durée
de la période d'engagement pendant laquelle les individus s'engagent à conserver la même décision d'assurance. Cette étude
indique que les modèles de décisions non-additifs tels que Dual Theory ou la Cumulative Prospect Theory disposent
d'un pouvoir descriptif supérieur au modèle classique d'espérance d'utilité. Cette étude permet également d'apporter un
éclairage nouveau sur le fait stylisé selon lequel les individus se montrent relativement réticents à souscrire une assurance
contre des risques de type catastrophique telles que les catastrophes naturelles, alors même que cette assurance leur est
proposée à des conditions tarifaires avantageuses.
Abstract.
This paper reports results from an experimental study that investigates insurance behaviors in
low-probability high-loss risk situations. This study reveals that insurance behaviors may depend on the
individual prior experience towards risk. It may also depend on the duration of the commitment period, namely
the period during which individuals commit themselves to maintain the same insurance decision. Non-additive
decision models such as Dual Theory and Cumulative Prospect Theory seem to have a higher
descriptive power than Expected Utility Theory when explaining subjects' behaviors. This paper
presents a direct experimental test of the prediction of Myopic Prospect Theory relative to insurance
demand. This study is also designed to test the significance of gambler's fallacy and availability
bias in the insurance decision process. These theoretical concepts help to understand many behaviors
commonly observed in reality but which remain unexplained within the E.U framework. In particular, this paper
provides new explanations about the puzzling fact that people usually fail to obtain insurance against
disaster-type risks such as natural disasters, even when premiums are close to actuarially fair levels.
According to our experimental results, the deficiency of insurance demand for natural disasters may be due to
the lack of individual prior experience towards such risks ; as well as the relatively short commitment
period of insurance policies (usually one fiscal year) compared with the empirical frequency of major natural
hazards (centennial and even more).
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